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ABSTRACT
This paper responds to the reviews by Edwards, Holm,
Koch, Thomas and Vehmas of Disability Rights and
Wrongs (2006). After summarising the recent history of
disability studies as a discipline, it explores: the political
nature of disability research, questions of ontology and
definition, and the uses and abuses of the expressivist
argument. Disability is an emerging field of enquiry and
constructive debate is to be welcomed.
Disability is a complex, scalar, multi-dimensional
phenomenon. The social exclusion and devaluation
of disabled people is widespread and persistent,
both in Britain and worldwide. Developing more
adequate understandings of the disability phenom-
enon and improving the participation and quality
of life of disabled people are linked and urgent
concerns.
Prevailing approaches to disability have been
flawed because they tend to individualise disabil-
ity, and to neglect the social and environmental
contexts which create additional burdens for
disabled people, or alternatively facilitate their
participation. These problems are characteristic of
both mainstream medical ethics (seeing impair-
ment as a problem to be avoided) and medical
sociology (dominated by the chronic illness
approach). Sometimes these approaches are
labelled ‘‘medical model’’ by British disability
studies researchers. I object to this practice because
it creates a straw person and suggests that
medicine is undesirable. Despite the deficiencies
of medical sociology and medical ethics, it would
be foolish to ignore the many valuable contribu-
tions to understanding disability made from these
perspectives. Moreover, it is not medicine, but
inappropriate medicalisation which is the root of
the problem.
Spurred by the unprecedented growth of dis-
abled people’s activism in many countries of the
world, disability studies developed as a radical
challenge to individualist or over-medicalised ways
of thinking. It is now a worldwide discipline, with
particular strengths in Britain, USA, Canada and
the Nordic countries, but also notable contribu-
tions from Australia, France and Germany. Within
and between each country, there are differences of
emphasis and definition. For example, North
American researchers have been influenced by a
minority group conception of disability, and
latterly have been preoccupied with cultural
representation and meaning; Nordic researchers
have relied on a relational understanding and have
concentrated on evaluating welfare services; British
researchers have adopted a strong ‘‘social model’’
conception and explored the role of barriers and
oppression in the lives of disabled people. In my
book, Disability Rights and Wrongs, I suggested that
there is a ‘‘family’’ of social contextual approaches
to disability, all of which share the same basic
emphasis on the social construction or social
creation of the disability problem.
I welcome the growth of disability studies,
applaud the commitment to social change, and
accept the dominant role of social and cultural
contexts and meanings in the creation of the
disability problem. My motivation for writing
Disability Rights and Wrongs was frustration with
the state of disability studies research in the UK,
which I believe is often blocked by an unhealthy
reliance on the social model of disability and an
unquestioning faith in the benefits of identity
politics. This is not to deny the valuable work
which continues to go on under the banner of
disability studies. While the close connection to the
lives and political movements of disabled people is
a distinctive and valuable aspect of UK disability
studies, I believe that it is necessary for academic
theory and research to attempt to find the truth,
rather than relying on ideology or slogans.
I realised that challenging deeply held beliefs
would not be popular. Nor did I have any illusions
that my account would be flawless. Therefore I
welcome constructive criticism. I am grateful to
the editors of this journal for giving space to this
symposium, and to the authors who have engaged
with my work and given me food for thought. It
was my ambition to promote a more open debate
about disability and about suitable remedies for the
disadvantages faced by disabled people. Where in
this journal and elsewhere my arguments have
prompted re-evaluation and inspired other
researchers, I am grateful for evidence that the
hard slog of writing was not wasted.
AS POLITICAL AS LIFE ITSELF?
Thomas and Koch are among those who have
regretted my revisionist approach to disability
theory and disability politics. Thomas, while
seeming to agree with me that the social model is
no longer helpful, believes that I may be under-
mining the discipline of disability studies by
washing dirty linen in public. Yet while Thomas
is very critical of my rejection of the social model,
she concludes by conceding that my position is
very close to hers.
To clarify, my objection to the social model is
not that it is partisan, but that it is wrong. It fails
to capture the complexity of disabled people’s lives.
Of course, many disabled people face oppression
much of the time. But disability cannot be defined
as oppression, because to do so creates a dangerous
circularity. It would not be possible to set out to
discover whether or not disabled people are
oppressed, if disability had previously been defined
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as oppression. You cannot assume that which needs to be
proven. After all, some disabled people may not be oppressed, or
may not always be oppressed. Does that mean that they are not
disabled? Are there then two groups, ‘‘disabled people’’ and
‘‘people with impairment’’? What about the ways in which
disabled people are disadvantaged by factors which cannot be
reduced to oppression?
Thomas’ over-reliance on the notion of ‘‘disablism’’ risks
similar reductionism, creating a false analogy with racism. For
example, people with intellectual impairments or dyslexia are
disadvantaged by living in societies based on written informa-
tion and expecting high levels of literacy and education. But this
does not constitute oppression, any more than snow and ice or
floods constitute oppression for people with mobility impair-
ments. Not all barriers are discriminatory. Where people are
penalised, through no fault of their own, because they are
unable to read or get around, then societies which aspire to
being inclusive and egalitarian have a duty to compensate such
individuals. Failure to do so effectively undermines a society’s
claim to fairness and humanity. In other words, there are
important additional steps to be made in the argument.
Disability is always an interaction between individual
factors—predominantly impairment, aspirations and motiva-
tions and contextual factors—environments, policies, barriers
and so forth. As Thomas has spotted, my approach to disability
is unoriginal, and largely compatible with the WHO
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and
Health. Discrimination and prejudice almost always play a
major part in the lives of disabled people. But disabled people
also face other difficulties arising from the predicament of
having impaired bodies or minds.
I do not pretend to have an original critique of the social
model. In my book, I cite many authors inside and outside
disability studies who have made similar claims. But I disagree
with Thomas when she suggests that British disability studies
has taken on board these criticisms and developed a more
sophisticated approach. Over the last ten years, I have often
witnessed younger researchers trying to take a more nuanced
approach, but being sidelined by an older generation of
academics who still repeat the crude formulas from the 1970s,
or by activists who are deeply suspicious of university research
and who want their ideological viewpoints reinforced, rather
than challenged.
Koch and Thomas claim that by challenging the social model,
I am seeking to depoliticise disability research, and that I have
become an enemy to disability rights. Not so. I think that
academic research has an important role to play in developing
more adequate understandings of the social exclusion and
discrimination that many disabled people face. For example, the
evidence which researchers can gather empirical evidence about
disabling barriers and prejudices can help lever change and
publicise oppression.1 Again and again in my own work I have
tried to do this. I also agree that social researchers should be
politically engaged, and my political work to promote disability
rights over the last two decades shows that I have always been
so engaged. Regardless of my scepticism towards one particular
current in disability studies thinking, I will continue to work for
disability equality both as a researcher and as a campaigner.
With Vehmas, I believe that while academics should be
engaged with contemporary political issues, they should also
aspire to the best possible standards of data collection and
analysis. If they allow their moral, emotional or political
preconceptions or affiliations to contaminate their research,
then they will produce shallow data or misleading arguments
which will be incapable of serving broader political objectives. I
accuse sections of the British disability studies community of
sometimes demonstrating exactly these failings. As Vehmas
argues, science and ideology must be kept separate as far as
possible. Biased research will never persuade the media or the
government that change is needed.
Thomas is astonished that I do not mention the journal
Disability and Society. She overlooks the fact that I cite no less
than 112 separate articles from the journal or its earlier
incarnation Disability, Handicap and Society. While I value the
leading role that the publication has taken, the partisan nature
of its editorial policy seems to me to be dangerous to the
discipline. Often, papers are refereed and books are reviewed
according to ideological rather than intellectual criteria. These
experiences leave me unable to share Thomas’ positive evalua-
tion of the journal.
Koch claims that I do not acknowledge that social and
workplace discrimination remains a reality for many persons.
While space limitations meant that the current book does not
engage with employment, I do make clear in the text that
disabled people face such barriers, and in other research—for
example with people with restricted growth—I have demon-
strated and analysed those barriers in some detail. Incidentally, I
think that the employment situation of disabled people is
complex. While there is considerable evidence of extensive
unfair discrimination, it is also the case that many disabled
people are limited in the type of work they can do, or the
amount of work they can do, because of their impairments.
Additionally, some disabled people lack the training, confidence
or motivation to work, while others would prefer to rely on
welfare benefits than enter the labour market. Thinking solely
in terms of employer discrimination rather than this wider
range of factors limits our understanding of the stubborn and
persistent nature of disabled people’s exclusion from the
workforce.
Koch also claims that my arguments have been disowned by
the disability studies and disability rights community.
Certainly, some activists and researchers have been hurt and
angered by my approach. But many others have responded very
positively to my attempt to open up a more nuanced space for
understanding disability. Unsolicited comments such as ‘‘sti-
mulating and thought provoking’’, ‘‘a breath of fresh air’’, ‘‘a
real breakthrough’’ have arrived in my email inbox from dozens
of disabled researchers. They do not agree with all my
arguments but accept the constructive intention behind my
book and share my commitment to improving the intellectual
rigour of disability studies. Koch appears worried about my
possible ostracism among the disability movement, but I am
glad to report that my contributions continue to be in demand
among disabled and non-disabled audiences.
Koch questions how I can claim to be disabled. I believed I
had discussed this point in the introduction to my book, but let
me reiterate. I have restricted growth, which has caused me
increasing physical limitation and pain over the last ten years.
From my research with other restricted growth people, I note
that most suffer similarly, and some end up reliant on
wheelchairs. Every single time I leave my home I experience
staring and negative comments, and distressingly commonly I
experience hostility and abuse in public spaces. As I previously
explained, due to intellect and class privilege, I have avoided
many of the economic and social disadvantages to which many
other restricted growth people are vulnerable, but it is incorrect
to say that I am never socially disadvantaged or publicly
ostracised. Someone who knows nothing about my life has no
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right to suggest that my identification as a disabled person is
inappropriate.
IMPAIRMENT/DISABILITY DISTINCTION
Koch advocates a constructionist approach and approves of
those who take a Foucauldian line. In earlier years, I found
Foucault intellectually invigorating, and many of my publica-
tions betrayed the influence of his arguments. I collaborated
with the late Mairian Corker in editing a volume which brought
post-structuralist and post-modern approaches to bear on
disability.2 Latterly, I have come to the conclusion that
Foucault is of more use if you are seeking to build an academic
career than if you are seeking to change society. I object to the
esoteric and inaccessible language and arguments which
contaminate many recent offerings in disability studies—
whether influenced by Foucault himself, or by Deleuze and
Guattari or other fashionable Continental theorists. I also
question whether the postmodern opposition to emancipatory
metanarratives and universal ethical norms undermines the
potential of these approaches for achieving the political goals of
subaltern groups.3
However, as Edwards has spotted, traces of my earlier
thinking remain in the book, which he suggests creates
inconsistencies. In combining and revising earlier material to
form the book, I may have left hostages to fortune, and I regret
that. But I do not think there is any basic contradiction in my
approach.
Different cultures, across space and time, have defined human
variation in different ways. For example, schizophrenia or
epilepsy have sometimes been regarded as spirit possession, to
be exorcised. Equally, only when society has developed certain
expectations of its members does the lack of ability to fulfil
those expectations become obvious and problematic. For
example, dyslexia remains hidden until society demands literacy
in order for people to be able to achieve employment. Moreover,
given that impairment is often scalar—for example, there is not
a polar distinction between blindness and vision, but a
continuum of visual acuity—legal and welfare systems have
to define how much visual impairment constitutes blindness, for
official and administrative purposes. Therefore there are process
of social definition and meaning inherent in the categorisation of
impairment, and in the identification of disabled people. Equally,
the ways in which societies define and categorise physical and
mental differences have implications for the way in which people
with those differences live their lives.4
However, to accept this obvious point does not mean
adopting a relativist position, or signing up with the anthro-
pologists and the postmodernists. Critical realists make a
distinction between ontology and epistemology. There has
always been dyslexia or schizophrenia, regardless of how
societies have understood and defined it. Epilepsy remains an
organic brain phenomenon, even if a tribal group defines it as
spirit possession. In many circumstances, impairment is
problematic in itself, as well as having broader cultural and
political consequences.
Whereas social constructionism has been welcomed as a tool
for political change, it may prove a false friend, as I long ago
argued.5 For those with hidden impairments, such as dyslexia or
chronic fatigue syndrome, a realist and medically based
approach to defining and understanding impairment is prefer-
able to the vagaries of constructionism. Many disabled people
long for a diagnosis to entitle them to welfare benefits and other
exemptions, and it is hard to see a practical alternative to
administering the complex entitlements consequent on disability.
Koch cites approvingly the Canadian Down Syndrome
Society’s redefinition of Down syndrome as a normal condition
rather than an affliction, disease, defect or disorder. While
lauding the humanity of their initiative, I am uncomfortable
with the ease with which they adopt the relativist position. For
example, if Down syndrome is just a social construct, then does
that imply that the various medical and surgical interventions
to help people with Down syndrome should be dispensed with?
My friends with Down syndrome have variously suffered major
cardiac malformations, gastro-intestinal problems and hearing
loss. I understand that they have a higher likelihood of
experiencing Alzheimer disease in later life. All these dimensions
of the syndrome, together with the intellectual impairments
which they also experience, result from having three copies of
chromosome 21. None of this means that David, Charlie, Amy,
Billy and the rest are less worthy of respect or inclusion. I count
myself privileged to have known them. But I wonder how much
it helps them to pretend that they are simply different, rather
than disabled. It is not clear what is meant by saying that Down
syndrome is a ‘‘natural genetic variation occurring in human
society’’. Of course that’s true, just as it’s accurate to describe
HIV a natural virus occurring in human society. But Down
syndrome is neither statistically normal nor, in my view, a
neutral difference. It is a predicament which makes life harder,
and I can understand why some prospective parents might wish
to avoid it in their children.
An opposite error seems to be made by Thomas.6 She bases
her approach on the social model dichotomy between impair-
ment and disability, leaving the former to the medical
sociologists and defining the latter solely in terms of oppression,
and reserving it for disability studies. It would be wrong to
think that medical sociology ignores socio-political issues, and
dangerous for disability studies to ignore questions of impair-
ment and the body. I would prefer to see the field of disability
studies including both domains and overcoming the crude dualism,
the better to understand the complex dialectic of disability.
EXPRESSIVISM
Holm and Vehmas worry that I have too easily dismissed the
expressivist objection to prenatal diagnosis. While I am sceptical
about the expressivist argument—which as Holm usefully
demonstrates comes in different versions—I accept that it does
important work in forcing us to attend to the ways in which
prenatal diagnosis—or other techniques of impairment preven-
tion—potentially send negative messages about the lives of
existing disabled people. I strongly concur with Holm’s
suggestion that actually existing prenatal diagnosis is deficient
in many respects. I do not think, contra Koch’s critique, that
genetic testing is value neutral. In my book, I draw attention to
negative language, to the prejudices of certain professionals, to
lack of informed consent, and to the ways in which the social
and cultural context is discriminatory. Among the implications
of the evidence which I summarise are that we urgently require
institutional reform of prenatal diagnosis, better training of
doctors and allied professions, and better provision of support to
disabled people and their families.
It is the strong version of expressivism which I find dubious. I
do not accept that those couples who seek to discover
information about their pregnancy and make the painful
decision to end a pregnancy where impairment is detected are
thus inevitably discriminatory or prejudiced against disabled
people. It is possible, and sometimes it is undoubtedly the case
they might have such motivations. But some impairments not
only make the lives of those who experience them more limited
Ethics
J Med Ethics 2008;34:11–14. doi:10.1136/jme.2006.019992 13
 group.bmj.com on May 20, 2010 - Published by jme.bmj.comDownloaded from 
and burdensome, but also correspondingly disrupt the lives of
those who care for them, and it seems to me rational and
humane for potential parents to seek to avoid such outcomes.
Equally, it is understandable that some disabled people are hurt
and threatened by this. I have often experienced those feelings
myself, when I have heard discussion of the desirability of
preventing the birth with individuals with disabilities.
Several important distinctions are necessary here. Negative
valuation of the lives of disabled people are often based on
prejudice, but are sometimes founded on evidence. Some disabled
people do experience very poor quality of life, and sometimes the
lives of some parents and carers are also limited as a result. But
the fact that someone’s quality of life is assessed to be low does
not have necessary implication for the value of their life, nor of its
worth to them and to those who love them. It may be a complex
balancing act, but it is possible—indeed desirable—to cherish and
support and include existing disabled people, even while
investing in measures which might minimise the impact of
disability on future generations. Clinicians, philosophers and
prospective parents have an obligation to be sensitive and
respectful when they come to discuss disability and screening.
So, of course, do social scientists and activists.
CONCLUSION
Better understanding and more regular exchange between the
fields of medical ethics and disability studies would be desirable.
It was one of my goals in writing my book to help each
community understand more of the other’s arguments and
concerns. Forthcoming publications will further aid in this
endeavour.7 8 I believe that it is necessary for philosophers to
understand the structural approach to disability, and the political
concerns which underpin disability studies. Equally, it is desirable
for disability studies scholars to refine and strengthen their
arguments, and to understand the diversity of philosophical
responses to the challenge of disability. I value the role of this
journal in facilitating this necessary and stimulating exchange,
and thank the other contributors for their attention to my work.
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REFERENCES
1. Barnes C. Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination. London: Hurst and co., 1991.
2. In: Corker M, Shakespeare T, eds. Disability/Postmodernism: Embodying disability
theory. London: Continuum, 2002.
3. Hartsock N. Foucault on power: a theory for women? In: Nicholson Linda J, ed.
Feminism/Postmodernism. New York and London: Routledge, 1990:157–76.
4. Hacking I. Making up people, in TC Helier and DE Welbery. Reconstructing
Individualism.Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986.
5. Shakespeare T. Social constructionism as a political strategy. In: Velody I, Williams
R, eds. The Politics of Constructionism. London: Sage, 1998.
6. Thomas C. Sociologies of Disabilities and Illness. London: Palgrave, 2007.
7. Kristiansen K, Shakespeare T, Vehmas S. Arguing about Disability. London:
Routledge, 2008.
8. Scully JL. Ethics in Disability: the moral differences of different bodies. Lanham, MD;
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
BNF for Children 2006, second annual edition
In a single resource:
c guidance on drug management of common childhood conditions
c hands-on information on prescribing, monitoring and administering medicines to children
c comprehensive guidance covering neonates to adolescents
For more information please go to bnfc.org.
Ethics
14 J Med Ethics 2008;34:11–14. doi:10.1136/jme.2006.019992
 group.bmj.com on May 20, 2010 - Published by jme.bmj.comDownloaded from 
